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ABSTRACT: 
 
Religion has been proven to influence a wide range of individual outcomes, 
including gender-specific health experiences such as fertility.  This study 
examines the role of religion in women’s decision-making, both broadly and 
with a special focus on reproductive decisions. Quantitative analysis of 
Cameroon (2004) and Senegal’s (2005) Demographic Health Surveys is combined 
with information from qualitative focus group discussions and interviews that 
were held in each country in 2011. These analyses were used to investigate 1) 
whether Muslim women have the same level of control over household decision-
making as their non-Muslim counterparts; 2) whether the extent of Muslim 
women’s participation in key household decision-making differ from their 
participation in reproductive decisions; 3) whether rates of contraceptive use and 
participation in reproductive decision-making differ between Muslims and non-
Muslims; and 4) how Muslim women and men view the influences and 
prescriptions of religion on the practice of family planning. Cameroon and 
Senegal serve as fruitful locales in which to investigate these questions, as the 
former represents a more pluralistic society while the latter is predominantly 
Muslim.  Findings suggest that religion continues to mediate women’s relative 
control in different arenas of household decision-making, including family 
planning. Given international concern over achieving reproductive health, 
crystallized in Millennium Development Goal 5, future interventions will need to 
be sensitive to the role of religion.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of religion is to shape moral and spiritual values (Finke and 
Adamczyk 2008; McQuillan 2004) and, to the extent that values and beliefs shape 
human behavior (Azjen and Fishbein 1977), one expects religion to ultimately 
shape behavior. Based on this premise, a large body of literature in social science 
has examined the effects of religion across a wide range of outcomes such as 
health (Dwyer, Clark, and Miller 1990), gender role attitudes (Para-Mallam 2010; 
Read 2003; Sieveking 2010), and sexual health and fertility (Agadjanian, Yabiku, 
and Fawcett 2009; Bop 2004; Knodel et al 1999; McQuillan 2004). Indeed, a few 
studies have examined religious differences in human fertility in the US but also 
in a few developing settings such as Ghana (Doctor, Phillips, and Sakeah 2009), 
usually showing substantial differences in outcomes. Still, while shedding light 
on these different outcomes, much of the research has not clarified the fine 
mechanisms through which religion matters. In other words, why exactly does 
religion matter?  
One popular but insufficiently tested explanation in the context of 
developing countries is mediation through gender relations. In particular, by 
shaping gender roles within the household, religion can affect a host of outcomes 
that require negotiation within families, and human reproduction fall squarely 
within this type of relationship. Literature on the fertility transition has focused 
on this issue of gender equity, arguing that high women’s status is correlated 
with lower fertility (McDonald 2000). Furthermore, other areas of negotiation 
2
	  
within the family include health care, and there is ample support that women’s 
involvement in these types of household decisions is associated with overall 
improved health outcomes for children (Fantahun et al 2007). In the wake of 
global fertility transitions and the slower fertility transitions often observed 
among Muslims (but also in light of broader interest in global dialogue between 
religions), there is significant interest in the media and academia today in 
understanding Muslim women’s lived experiences.  
This study aims to shed light on the complexity of Islam and women’s 
relationships with their faith, and uncover how these relationships mediate 
women’s relative control in different arenas of household decision-making. 
Focusing on this relationship at two levels – broad experiences in household 
decision-making and specific experiences regarding fertility decisions – this 
paper seeks to resolve theoretical assumptions about Islam and gender and 
actual experiences of Muslim women in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In recent years, there has been much attention directed at the high fertility 
of Muslim societies. In the popular press, a recent CNN report stated that the 
worldwide Muslim population is on a sharply increasing trajectory. Soon, 
Muslims are expected to comprise 25% of the world population, while today 
Muslims make up about 20% of the world population, around 1.25 billion people 
(Roudi-Fahimi 2004, 1). This growth stems from the typically higher level of 
fertility among Muslim populations. This high fertility is itself assumed to derive 
from limited access to, or acceptance of, family planning and contraceptive 
services. However, there is little empirical consensus on the relationship between 
Islam and family planning, as Muslim scholars, writers, demographers, 
economists, and health planners throughout the world continue to debate the 
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stance of Islam on family planning. For instance, a paper by Omran questions the 
tendency to frame the debate on this issue along a simplistic “either/or” choice 
that implies that Islam could only be “for” or “against” family planning (1992, 
203). As Heather Boonstra emphasizes, “Unlike Catholicism, for example, Islam 
does not have a central authoritative structure of religious interpretation. 
Instead, this religion plays out differently across cultures, and various schools of 
law and religious sects offer diverse understandings about how Islam should be 
practiced” (2001, 4). This is quite evident in the debate on family planning, and in 
the diversity of arguments on either side of the debate. Opponents of family 
planning in the Muslim community cite a wide variety of reasons why family 
planning is not in accord with Islam, from the notion that family planning 
programs are an attempt to decrease the Muslim population to the idea that 
contraceptives promote immoral behavior to the idea that contraception is wa’d, 
or murder (Omran 1992, 203). Proponents of family planning cite equally varied 
arguments, from the idea that spacing births prevents human suffering to the fact 
that the Prophet Muhammad used coitus interruptus, or withdrawal, as a method 
of birth control, setting a permissive precedent (Roudi-Fahimi 2004, 3).  
In examining individuals’ lived experiences, it’s important to emphasize 
the wide cross-national variation in contraceptive usage among Muslim women. 
For example, in Iran, where nearly 100% of the population is Muslim, 73% of 
married women are on some form of contraceptives, a figure that is comparable 
to the United States (Boonstra 2001; Greene 2011). In Senegal, on the other hand, 
only 12% of married women use any method of contraception. Further, the 
figures for Senegal are not dramatically different from other non-Muslim 
countries with similar levels of socioeconomic development in Africa (DHS 2010) 
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Given that around 1.25 billion people in the world are Muslim, this diversity 
among Muslims should not come as a surprise. Muslim experiences vary across 
nationalities and regions, language, race, and type of government, whether 
secular or Islamic (Roudi-Fahimi 2004, 1). 
While several studies have examined the relationship of Islam and family 
planning, few focus on Africa. My literature review showed numerous reports 
on the stance of Islam and Muslim religious leaders on family planning and 
multiple papers addressing family planning in sub-Saharan Africa, including A 
Qualitative Study of Clandestine Contraceptive Use in Urban Mali. However, only 
one paper directly discussed the actual perceptions and behaviors of Muslim 
women in relation to family planning (Bop 2005). Bop found, in Senegal, “a 
strong opposition, both from men and women, to women’s individual choice and 
control over her body as far as family planning, sexuality, or abortion are 
concerned” (2005, 1). What is fascinating about this attitude is that Senegal has a 
secular government and positive relations exist between the Muslim and 
Christian populations. Yet, compared to the Islamic State of Iran, Senegalese 
Islam appears to be significantly less permissive in terms of family planning 
when one looks at the statistics. This underscores the cross-national variation in 
Muslim women’s experiences in relation to family planning.  
In “The Squabble That Never Ends: Religion and Fertility,” Basu (2004) 
provides a critical assessment. She argues that too often, fertility and family 
planning literature “demonize” a particular religion, often Islam, when in fact, a 
multitude of factors play into fertility decisions and behavior. As she argues:   
We might come to the surprising conclusion that there is much 
more convergence with other groups than the publicized 
differences project. A more impartial examination of the 
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complexities underlying simple measures of fertility and 
population growth will also reveal that finally, we are all – Hindu, 
Muslim and Christian – driven by the same basic quotidian needs 
and constraints, and that our reproductive behavior is one 
important way of reflecting these desires and dilemmas (2004, 
4296). 
 
Her paper emphasizes the complexities of experience, asking to incorporate 
religious, economic, social, cultural, historical, educational, and other factors in 
analysis of behavior. 
This paper thus investigates the possible effects of Muslim women’s religious 
convictions on their perception and consumption of family planning services. I 
ask four specific research questions: 
1. Do Muslim women have the same level of control over household 
decision-making as their non-Muslim counterparts in Cameroon and 
Senegal? 
2. Does the extent of Muslim women’s participation in key household 
decision-making differ from their participation in reproductive decisions? 
In other words, if these women do not participate in household decision, 
does this non-participation include reproductive health? 
3. Do the rates of contraceptive use and participation in reproductive 
decision-making among Muslim women differ from those observed 
among non-Muslims? 
4. What do Muslim women and men say about the influences and 
prescriptions of religion on the practice of family planning?  
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In this section, I review the previous research on the implications of religious 
affiliation generally for a range of individual outcomes, followed by an 
examination of the role that Islam, in particular, plays in shaping life outcomes.  
As a second step, I also consider the relationship between religion and sexual 
and reproductive health outcomes, focusing both on religion in general and 
Islam in particular. Finally, the section concludes with an examination of 
literature focusing on Muslim lived experiences in regards to sexual health.  
Religion and Individual Outcomes 
Numerous studies have found a relationship between religion and women’s 
individual outcomes, including health, social roles, empowerment, and decision-
making power (Doctor, Phillips, and Sakeah 2009; Agadjanian, Yabiku, and 
Fawcett 2009; McQuillan 2004; Gyimah, Takyi, and Addai 2006; Knodel et al 
1999; Para-Mallam 2010). Emphasizing the strong institutional presence of 
religions, McQuillan (2004) specified that, “more than any other social 
institution, religions have elaborated moral codes that are meant to guide human 
behavior, and many of the great religious traditions have been given special 
attention to issues of sexuality, the roles of men and women, and the place of 
family in society” (27). Sacred scripture, as communicated by religious authority, 
speaks specifically to the aforementioned issues, and thus its influence is felt at 
both the community and individual level, through the normalization of specific 
social attitudes and roles.  
This has been argued by many to perpetuate gender inequality, especially 
in developing countries. For instance, Para-Mallam (2010) studied pervasive 
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gender inequality in Nigerian society and found that, “Nigerian traditional, 
Christian and Islamic religious values exert a powerful influence over Nigerian 
social life in general and over the nature of gender roles and relations in 
particular” (459).   
On the other hand, the positive impact of religion on women’s sense of 
empowerment has also been illustrated. Ultra-Orthodox Jews represent a 
conservative subset of their religion, marked by more traditional gender roles. 
Many more progressive Jewish communities view Ultra-Orthodox practices and 
gender norms as, “anachronistic, hierarchical and irrelevant to modern feminist 
values” (Ringel 2007, 26). However, participants in Ringel’s study communicated 
a sense of empowerment endowed on them by their faith, identifying their 
fulfillment through “their children, husbands, family and community, rather 
than through professional or individual endeavors” (Ringel 2007, 40).  
Respondents’ religious convictions shaped their lived experiences tremendously, 
leading them to adopt more traditional gender roles within which they felt 
powerful.  
Islam and Individual Outcomes 
While there is extensive research on all religions and gender, the case of Islam is 
perhaps one of the most compelling and controversial topics. Islam is generally 
perceived as a more conservative religion and, as argued by Read (2003), 
“women who belong to and participate in conservative denominations are 
typically more traditional in their gender role orientations” (207). Read’s study 
examined the experiences of both Christian and Muslim Arab-American women, 
focusing on differential gender role attitudes. His results found that Muslim 
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women tended to be more gender traditional than Christian women, even after 
controlling for educational attainment, age, and children (214). He also found 
that “religiosity is linked to inegalitarian views on gender, and the effects are 
especially strong for women who believe in scriptural inerrancy” (217). Thus, 
Read’s results demonstrate a significant difference between Christian and 
Muslim women in regards to their gender role attitudes, where Muslim women 
are more traditional. Furthermore, women who are more religious tend to adopt 
more traditional gender role attitudes.  
Ali et al. (2008) similarly explored the differential religious experiences of 
Christian and Muslim women in regards to feminism. Their Muslim participants 
demonstrated a similar sense of traditional gender role attitudes, stressing the 
complementarities of men and women’s roles. Women, they felt, are naturally 
more nurturing than men, and thus “should be the primary caregivers for the 
children” (43). In Nigeria, it has been argued that these types of gender attitudes 
rooted in Islamic tradition are the basis for female subordination, justifying 
“pervasive discriminatory treatment of women and girls, especially with regard 
to marital relations, inheritance . . .female autonomy and participation in intra-
household and public decision-making processes” (Para-Mallam 2010, 463). 
Thus, Islam is identified as an oppressive force in women’s lives, perpetuating 
harmful gender role attitudes.  
In contrast to the aforementioned findings, many argue that Islam is in 
actuality a feminist faith. While Ali et al. (2008) stressed the nurturing role of 
women, they also emphasized the fact that a high level of respect and value was 
associated with these roles (43). Moreover, an emphasis on more traditional 
gender roles does not necessarily mean a lack of autonomy. Sieveking (2007) 
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argued, “recent empirical studies have found no evidence that Muslim women 
have less autonomy than women belonging to other religious groups in the same 
society” (30). Furthermore, previous studies have argued that religious teachings 
on women are subject to change alongside societal transformation, since 
“religious ideas are produced in relation to the existing intellectual context of 
debates and back-and-forth arguments among diverse ideological producers” 
(Moaddel 1998, 126). Ultimately, individuals in particular social contexts 
determine the way religion is experienced, and thus it is a dynamic process. 
Consequently, Islam, like any faith, is experienced diversely, and can be used as 
a tool promoting women’s rights. 
For instance, Maimouna Kane, founder of the Association of Senegalese 
Jurists (ASJ), claims, “Muslim religion, in contrast to what people think, defends 
the rights of women. It has set up a revolution in relation to the situation women 
had before. Islam is not opposing itself against progress; in fact it urges us 
towards science, towards progress” (Sieveking 2007, 35). In Senegal, in fact, 
different Islamic groups have used Islam to promote gender equality. Réseau 
Siggil Jigeen (RSJ), Sieveking shows for instance, began a campaign to reform 
Senegal’s family code – a set of laws drawing from shari’a law – using religious 
arguments in order to promote women’s rights. RSJ “supports the government in 
the areas of family planning and AIDS prevention, thereby representing 
positions . . . which are contested and even fiercely opposed by locally 
established religious authorities” (Sieveking 2007, 38).  
Furthermore, it has been shown in Indonesia that “the growing role of 
Islam in the public sphere provides Muslim women with an important platform, 
facilitating their involvement in debates over issues like shari'a law, abortion and 
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pornography” (Rinaldo 2008, 1784) In this context, then, women use Islam as a 
tool to gain influence in their society by offering interpretations of the scripture 
that bolster their cause. Multiple understandings of Islam exist, providing a 
valuable opportunity for marginalized groups to gain a voice (Rinaldo 2008).  
Similar movements in Tunisia and Morocco exist, providing women with 
a political platform from which to voice their concerns. According to Dalmasso 
and Cavatorta (2010), “a number of Islamic movements ideologically accept the 
necessity of changes with respect to women’s rights, but contend that the 
justification for such changes should be found in indigenous values and 
traditions rather than ‘alien’ ones imported from the west” (220). This statement 
demonstrates the ability to promote women’s rights within the context of Islam, 
rather than assuming women’s rights can only be achieved through secular 
means, in direct opposition to religious values and tradition (Dalmasso and 
Cavatorta 2010, 213).  
Religion and Sexual Health 
Moving from a more general dialogue between religion and women’s lived 
experiences, there is extensive literature on the topic of religion’s influence on 
sexual health, demography and fertility. For instance, religion has been found to 
be a significant factor in maternal health services usage (Gyimah, Takyi, and 
Addai 2006). Even after controlling for socio-economic variables, Muslim and 
traditional women in Ghana were significantly less likely to use maternal health 
services than Christian women (2930). Furthermore, Agha, Hutchinson, and 
Kusanthan (2006) examined the influence of women’s religious affiliation on HIV 
risk in Zambia. They sought to understand whether religious stances on pre-
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marital sex and condom use impacted young women’s exposure to HIV. 
However, contrary to previous claims that religion is relevant in shaping 
behavior relating to HIV (Gyimah, Takyi, and Addai 2006), this study found the 
influence of religion to be minimal (554).  
Looking at fertility specifically, Hayford and Morgan (2008) established a 
link between a woman’s religiosity and her fertility in the United States, 
claiming, “women who report that religion is ‘very important’ in their everyday 
life have both higher fertility and higher intended fertility than those saying 
religion is ‘somewhat important’ or ‘not important,’” (1163) since those who are 
more religious represented more traditional family and gender attitudes than 
their counterparts, emphasizing their role as mothers first.  
 Doctor, Phillips, and Sakeah (2009) examined this linkage in Nigeria, 
assessing “the extent to which changes in religious affiliation among women is 
associated with concurrent changes in contraceptive use and parity” (113). 
Implicit in this statement are three hypotheses: that different religions exert their 
influence on contraceptive use and gender equality; that different religions have 
different influences; and that contraceptive use and gender equality are 
interrelated.  
 Taking issue with the tendency to establish a defined stance on one 
particular religion’s influence on fertility, Alaka Basu studied fertility of 
Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus in India. While she concluded that the Muslim 
population does indeed have a higher fertility than other religious groups, 
“acknowledging these differences is not the same as understanding them and the 
recent politicking on the subject has not even millimetered us towards a greater 
understanding of the matter” (Basu 2004, 4295). Basu brings up a critical point. 
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Statistics have the power to tell compelling stories, enabling scholars and the 
population at large to better understand the social world. However, when 
statistics are not used critically, they can tell a skewed and inaccurate version of 
the truth. In Basu’s example, establishing the influence of a particular religion – 
Islam – on fertility without looking at other contributing factors is a gross misuse 
of statistical evidence.   
More recent research has also touched on this point, emphasizing that, 
while the importance of religious context has been established for a variety of 
gender-related topics, “the literature addressing the role of religion in 
reproduction typically compares either doctrines or individuals; contextual 
variations are rarely investigated” (Agadjanian, Yabiku, and Fawcett 2009; 469). 
Thus, their investigation focused on the religious composition of the 
communities they studied and the institutional presence of religion in each 
context, understanding that when contexts vary, experiences also change.  
Islam and Sexual Health 
While Islam clearly values procreation and fertility, as in Christianity and 
Judaism, Islamic texts are not an obstacle to contraceptive usage, and “many 
Muslim religious thinkers over the past quarter-century have maintained that . . . 
family planning is permitted and even encouraged by Islamic law” (Boonstra 
2001, 4).  In fact, the majority of jurists coming from eight out of nine legal 
schools support family planning (Omran 1992, 201), with the exception of 
permanent methods (sterilization) or abortion, as expressed by many religious 
leaders (McQuillan 2004, 28). One example of textual support for contraceptives 
is that withdrawal (coitus interruptus) was practiced as a contraceptive method 
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during the Prophet Muhammad’s time, and he offered no prohibition to its 
practice. Furthermore, Islamic jurisprudence does not interpret this silence on the 
issue as an omission, because God is all-knowing (Morgan et al 2002, 518; Roudi-
Fahimi 2004, 3). 
 A further support for family planning that is often cited is that spacing 
births supports a family’s well being (Monifar 2007, 301). In fact, spacing births is 
addressed in the Qur’an in the discussion on breastfeeding. A religious leader in 
Iran, according to Monifar (2007) “claims that the Qur’an fixed the period of 
lactation at two full years . . . This argues in favour of allowing steps to be taken 
to prevent pregnancy during the period of breast-feeding” (302).  Roudi-Fahimi 
(2004) also addressed this point, specifying that avoiding intercourse for two 
years in order to avoid pregnancy would be a hardship, and thus couples can use 
contraceptive means to avoid pregnancy (5). Not only do religious leaders in 
many diverse contexts support family planning, many have used the scripture to 
encourage the use of family planning methods in Islamic societies. 
One of the most successful examples of family planning program 
implementation in the Muslim world is Iran, where the national family planning 
program is “considered a model for developing nations and other Muslim 
countries” due to its success in combating high maternal and infant mortality 
and encouraging contraceptive uptake. In fact, by 1997, contraceptive use was at 
73% of married women (Boonstra 2001, 6).  Iran’s family planning program came 
as a necessity when the needs of the population were not being met (Roudi-
Fahimi 2004, 5).  In the ten years between the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the 
creation of this program, contraceptives were viewed as a harmful western 
innovation, but the high population growth was soon recognized as an obstacle 
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to the well being of the Iranian people (Roudi-Fahimi 2002, 3). The success of 
Iran’s family planning program is due in large part to the collaboration of 
religious leaders and institutions in legitimizing family planning within Islam 
(McQuillan 2004, Ahmadi 2007). Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran provides a 
rich illustration of the permissibility of family planning within Islam. 
Perception of Muslims on Islam and Sexual Health 
Regardless of what any “official” stance Islamic religious leaders and jurists may 
hold regarding sexual health, Islam and Muslims are not synonymous. That is to 
say, understanding Islam and sexual health does not translate to understanding 
Muslims’ behavior and experiences of sexual health. In Cameroon, one imam 
interviewed made this distinction, saying that there are three conceptions of 
Islam to consider: Islam as science, Islam as a religion, and finally, Muslims 
attempting to understand Islam and live their lives in accordance with Islam. 
This section summarizes the extant literature concerning the lived experiences of 
Muslims in regards to sexual health.  
Before discussing Muslims’ attitudes toward family planning specifically, 
it is important to recognize the incredible diversity of Muslims throughout the 
world. Chaundry (1982) articulated this point well, saying: 
One of the problems with the Islamic explanation (of high fertility) 
is that it treats as monolithic a trait shared by close to a billion 
people worldwide, and that has adapted to, and been affected by, 
diverse regional contexts. The diversity in the doctrine and the 
cultural context of Islam calls into question the recourse to Islam as 
an explanation for demographic trends (1).  
 
At the time of Chaundry’s paper, the world Muslim population was even smaller 
than today. In fact, about one-fifth of the world’s population - as of 2004 – was 
Muslim, well over one billion people (Roudi-Fahimi 2004, 1). Of this population, 
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Chaundry stressed, diverse races, ethnicities, languages, and degrees of religious 
conservatism are represented, and Muslims live under both secular and Islamic 
governments (1). Thus, to make a generalization about the fertility of so diverse a 
population is problematic, given that all these other contextual factors may 
influence fertility as well. 
 One study that examined the fertility behaviors of Muslim women in nine 
countries came to this conclusion, saying “the practice of Islam is neither a 
‘hindrance nor a stimulating factor in fertility decline, at the global level’” 
(Mahler 1999, 4). The study’s inability to recognize a global pattern was due to 
variations in educational attainment, exposure to mass media, living 
environments, and several other influences (1). Diverse contexts create diverse 
experiences in relation to religion and family planning.  
 That being said, it is possible to examine the fertility attitudes and 
preferences of Muslims, so long as context is accounted for. Studying the outlook 
of Muslims on this issue is fascinating, because of the juxtaposition between their 
opinions and those of Islamic jurists, who are generally unified in their support 
of family planning (Barrett 2007, 2). McQuillan (2004) articulated this 
phenomenon, saying “While . . . surveys of religious leaders suggest general 
approval of fertility control, surveys in several Muslim populations nevertheless 
find that men and women frequently give religious reasons for not practicing 
contraception,” demonstrating the importance of differentiating between an 
official stance on an issue and the perceptions of the faithful in interpreting those 
lessons (28). 
This can be seen in several contexts. In the Gambia, for instance, Valente et 
al (1994) found that focus group respondents expressed the belief that Islam was 
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directly opposed to modern methods of contraceptives (96), an opinion that is 
echoed throughout Muslim communities. In Senegal, for example, Codou Bop 
met one nurse who expressed her frustration, explaining: 
We have a hard time trying to convince people that Islam forbids 
limitation of births but does allow family planning when the goal is 
birth spacing. At the clinics, we receive so many women who do 
not want any more children, but who believe their husband would 
not let them use the pill because he is persuaded Islam opposes 
family planning (2005, 17).  
 
This example demonstrates the variability within Islam. Indeed, Islam cannot be 
understood without recognizing its humanity. That is to say, “Religious leaders, 
government officials, and ordinary believers interpret, reinterpret, resist, 
manipulate, and synthesize religious texts and teaching as a part of daily life” 
(Barrett 2007, 1).  
 Castle et al (1999) encountered this interpretation in their study of 
clandestine contraceptive use in Mali. They explained this in terms of the belief 
in pre-destination, writing,  “God or destiny is thought to predetermine the 
number of children a couple has, and seeking to change what such powerful 
forces have ascribed is considered irreverent or pointless” (234). They argued 
that this “erroneous” belief that predestination prohibits contraceptives is 
widespread in Islamic Mali. 
 It is possible, however, to recognize that this belief is not supported in all 
Muslim communities. Other literature has specified certain circumstances for 
which particular Muslim communities accept family planning. In Senegal, for 
instance, Bop (2005) found that couples were allowed to practice family planning 
in order to protect the mother and children’s health (18). However, this is the 
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only justification she encountered, and the majority of other studies are quiet on 
this particular topic. 
 
3. THEORY 
This paper is interested in the differential experiences of Muslim women in two 
opposing sub-Saharan contexts; namely, a majority Muslim society and a 
majority Christian society. While Senegal is a secular country, its population is 
95% Muslim, whereas Cameroon is only 20% Muslim.  Bearing this in mind, the 
study explores how a woman’s religious context influences experiences of 
decision-making broadly, and health and fertility, specifically. There has been 
much discussion regarding the role of religion in shaping social norms and daily 
life, but throughout the extant literature, four main theories recur  regarding 
religion and fertility. They are: the characteristics hypothesis, the particularized 
theology hypothesis, the interaction hypothesis, and the minority group status 
hypothesis.  What follows is a brief discussion on these theories. 
Calvin Goldscheider articulated the first two hypotheses in the early 
1970s. He critically examined past approaches used to understand religion’s role 
in fertility, noting that two arguments were commonly relied upon: the 
characteristics hypothesis and the particularized theology hypothesis (McQuillan 
2004, 26) The characteristics hypothesis claims that it is factors other than religion 
that account for observed differences in religious groups’ reproductive behavior. 
These other factors include socio-economic and demographic factors 
(Goldscheider 1971).  
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The particularized theology hypothesis, “holds that the presence or 
absence of specific religious tenets about contraception, abortion, and family size 
affect attitudes and behaviour . . . religion . . . prescribes a particular but more 
comprehensive normative structure that guides familial and social life” (Knodel 
et al 1999, 149). This hypothesis relates to different interpretations of family 
planning’s permissibility in light of the omission of such discussion in Islamic 
scripture.  
 The third hypothesis is the interaction hypothesis, which draws from both 
of the previous hypotheses in developing its own theory. The interaction 
hypothesis assumes that, regardless of religion, all groups are similar in their 
response to socio-economic change. Knodel et al. (1999) recognize a shortcoming 
in this hypothesis, stating that, “no allowance is made for differences in the 
nature of the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and 
reproductive behaviour and attitudes among groups” (149).  
 The fourth and final hypothesis is the minority group status hypothesis. 
Goldscheider developed this hypothesis in order to emphasize the social status 
of religious groups being examined (McQuillan 26). This hypothesis suggests 
that demographers must, when examining religion, include “the total content of 
that social organization, of which the particular theology is but one part and 
often not the most significant” (1971, 274), such as gender relationships. More 
specifically, the minority-group status “argued that minority groups often face 
barriers to full social and economic integration into the dominant society, and 
that one way to limit the effect of these barriers to achievement was to reduce 
fertility” (McQuillan 2004: 27). However, if groups feel strongly disadvantaged 
within their context, the response may be to ensure group preservation through 
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high fertility. Furthermore, devotion to group cohesion will facilitate a greater 
commitment to social norms specific to the group (Knodel et al 1999, 150).  
 
4. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Senegal and Cameroon at a glance 
Table 4.1 provides a brief comparison of Senegal and Cameroon. Although both 
countries lie in sub-Saharan Africa and have comparable population sizes (12.5 
million in Senegal and 19.5 million in Cameroon as of 2009), they differ greatly in 
other characteristics, as table 4.1 illustrates. At a national level, 15% more of 
Cameroon’s population resides in an urban area than Senegal. Interestingly, 
urbanization is often associated with improvements in other development 
indicators, such as life expectancy and infant mortality. This is not the case in 
comparing these two contexts. According to the World Bank, Cameroon’s life 
expectancy is shorter than Senegal’s; while its infant mortality rate is double that 
of Senegal (95 deaths per 1,000 live births versus 51 deaths). Cameroon does 
surpass Senegal in it’s literacy rate, however, with 76% of the adult population 
reportedly literate in comparison to Senegal’s 42% (World Bank 2011).  
 The two countries vary in terms of other important characteristics, as well. 
The most important one to consider in the context of this study is religion. While 
Senegal is about 95% Muslim and 5% Christian, Cameroon is a pluralist country: 
only 20% of the population is Muslim, with Christians representing 40% and 
indigenous adherents making up the final 40% (CIA World Factbook). 
 
 
20
Table 4.1. Comaprative Country Characteristics, Cameroon & Senegal 2009
Population1 Poverty2 Urban Population3 Life Expectancy4 Infant Mortality5 Literacy6 GNI Per Capita7
Senegal 12.5 - 43 56 51 42 1,040
Cameroon 19.5 40 58 51 95 76 1,190
1(millions)
2,3 (% population)
4 (years)
5(per 1,000 live births)
6(% of population 15+)
7(Atlas method, US$)
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Another important factor to consider is fertility. As of 2011, Cameroon’s 
birth rate was 33.04 births per 1,000 persons, while the total fertility rate is 4.17 
children born/woman. Senegal’s birth rate in 2011 was fairly similar, albeit 
slightly higher, with 36.73 births per 1,000 persons. Similarly, the total fertility 
rate reported is slightly higher than Cameroon, with 4.78 children born per 
woman (CIA World Factbook). This following section provides background into 
the female population of each nation.  
Women in Senegal and Cameroon 
Data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) enables the formation of a 
recent snapshot of the female population of both Cameroon and Senegal in terms 
of relevant sociodemographic characteristics. DHS data is statistically 
representative, and so the findings below can be generalized for the entire female 
population of both countries. The following table and figures provide a summary 
comparison of the national context in which this study has been conducted based 
on the 2004 DHS survey in Cameroon and the 2005 DHS survey in Senegal. In 
particular, religious composition, urban population, wealth, and education are 
discussed. 
 Table 4.2 compares selected socio-demographic characteristics of 
Cameroon and Senegal in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The first comparison, 
percent Muslim, clearly demonstrates the unique religious context that each 
nation presents. Senegal represents a majority Muslim population, with almost 
96% of the respondents identifying as Muslim. In contrast, Cameroonian 
respondents were only 9.5% Muslim, with the remainder of respondents 
identifying with a Christian or other faith.  
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Table 4.2. Comparative Socio-demographic Characteristics, Cameroon 2004 & Senegal 2005
% Muslim % Urban % Married or cohabiting
Senegal 95.7 43.2 70.0
Cameroon 9.5 49.5 67.4
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 Examining the urban population in each country, there is only a slight 
variation, as Cameroon is 6.3% more urban than Senegal. Both countries are 
nearly 50% urban according to the DHS. Finally, respondents from both Senegal 
and Cameroon represent a similar story in terms of marriage and co-habitation. 
In both contexts, about 70% of respondents were either married or co-habiting 
with their partners.  
Figure 4.1: Wealth Index, Cameroon 2004 & Senegal 2005 
 
         
 
Figure 4.1 compares the wealth stratification of Senegal and Cameroon. In both 
contexts, about 18% of respondents were in the poorest wealth index category. In 
Cameroon, however, the highest percentage of the population  (23.3% of 
respondents) represented the richest, whereas in Senegal, the highest percentage 
reported (24.4% of respondents) were identified in the “middle” wealth index 
category. The graph illustrates these divergent trends. The pattern in Cameroon 
shows a slight increase in population as wealth increases. In Senegal, however, 
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there is a more triangular structure, where the percent of population tapers off in 
the more extreme wealth indexes.  
Figure 4.2: Highest Education Achieved, Cameroon 2004 & Senegal 2005 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 looks at the educational distribution of DHS respondents. This table 
illustrates one of the clearest differences between Senegalese respondents and 
Cameroonian respondents. While 20.1% of Cameroonian respondents reported 
no education, an astonishing 62.9% of Senegalese respondents had no education, 
while only .6% achieved a higher level of education. Cameroonian respondents 
overall demonstrated a much higher educational achievement than Senegalese 
respondents, with nearly 40% achieving secondary education in Cameroon. 
While all of these statistics paint an aggregate picture of Senegal and 
Cameroon in recent years, they don’t tell us much about the differential 
experiences of women within each country. It is unclear whether a particular 
group of women is more likely to achieve high levels of education or to 
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disproportionately represent a particular wealth index. The remainder of the 
paper delves more deeply into the differential experiences of women in both 
contexts, focusing specifically on their religious affiliation (Muslim or non-
Muslim).  
 
5. DATA AND METHODS 
This study utilized a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Quantitative analysis sought to address research 
questions one through three, drawing from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). The DHS are series of national representative surveys fielded 
over the last two decades in over 75 developing countries, primarily those in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Started in 1984 and funded largely by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the DHS surveys 
collect information on topics such as fertility, family planning, maternal and 
child health, gender, HIV/AIDS, malaria and nutrition. Beyond the core data on 
fertility and health, surveys also include information on religious affiliation.  The 
DHS are an ideal choice to investigate the relationship between religious 
affiliation and reproductive decision-making for three reasons.  First, they 
include information on both religious affiliation and a host of decision-making 
questions; second, the samples are typically large, ranging from 5,000 (often seen 
in the early survey years) to 30,000 (seen in more recent surveys); and third, the 
replication of DHS across and within several countries creates an appropriate 
design for cross-national analyses. This study utilizes unrestricted county micro 
data files, specifically the woman file, which contains a line for each woman aged 
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15-49 in the sample. The study uses the 2004 micro data file for Cameroon and 
the 2005 micro data file for Senegal. The samples are both large: 14,602 
respondents for Senegal and 10,656 for Cameroon.  
The purpose of this data analysis is to explore the statistical relationship 
between religious affiliation and decision-making behavior within a larger 
context of women’s general life experiences and to determine significance of the 
relationship, especially when controlling for other sociodemographic variables. 
A key feature of this analysis is to explore variation in multiple aspects of the 
women-decision-making equation. First, does one find evidence of religion-
related differences in women’s attitudes and control of household decisions? If 
such evidence exists, do similar differences appear in fertility-related decisions? 
In essence, health decision-making power is contrasted with women’s control of 
purchasing, social mobility, education, and other household decisions. This 
process will help address the question of whether decision-making within the 
reproductive arena is a special case within Islam. 
 In order to more thoroughly illustrate the DHS findings, a field 
exploration involved conducting qualitative research in Yaoundé, Cameroon and 
Dakar, Senegal. The qualitative research served to provide illustrative insight 
into findings from the DHS data, a supplement intended to add richness to – and 
better understanding of – the quantitative data collected from DHS. This step 
included two components. The first component was a total of four focus group 
discussions with an average of twelve participants each in Dakar and Yaoundé. 
Participants in Dakar included both Muslim men and women of reproductive 
age; participants in Cameroon were all Muslim women of reproductive age. 
These discussions covered a wide variety of topics, beginning broadly with 
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questions targeting women’s household decision-making power and 
subsequently focusing on attitudes toward fertility decision-making.  
Additionally, several one-on-one interviews were conducted with health 
providers, community religious leaders, and individuals actively involved in 
their religious communities. These interviews sought to understand the 
perception of individuals and religious communities in regards to family 
planning. Several similar themes were explored in these interviews as in the 
focus group discussions. Furthermore, interviews with several Muslim religious 
leaders in Yaoundé shed light on the perception of Muslim authorities on all 
relevant topics while interviews with health providers targeted perceived trends 
and shifts in attitudes regarding family planning from the provider’s perspective. 
All interviews and focus groups shed light on the immense complexity of the 
topic and the numerous sociodemographic factors influencing and shaping this 
relationship in both contexts. The following section explores the results of both 
the quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
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6. FINDINGS: ISLAM AND HOUSEHOLD DECISION-
MAKING  
1. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS: 
Differential Characteristics of Muslim and non-Muslim Women 
Table 6.1 begins to look more closely at the differential experiences of Muslims 
and non-Muslims in Senegal and Cameroon, addressing the questions of how 
being Muslim woman in these contexts correlates with one’s educational status, 
urban residency, wealth, and marital status. 
 The first consideration is educational status. In both Cameroon and 
Senegal, the average Muslim woman has a lower educational status than her 
non-Muslim counterpart. For instance, the mean level of education achieved for 
Muslim women in Senegal is very basic primary schooling.   
It’s important to note that the average non-Muslim woman in Senegal also 
has a very low level of education (mean = 1.03, or incomplete primary). 
Educational attainment in Cameroon is slightly higher for all women, but the 
same pattern persists. In terms of urban residency, non-Muslim women in 
Senegal are more likely than Muslim women to reside in an urban area, and the 
pattern persists for non-Muslim women, as well. Furthermore, non-Muslim 
women in Senegal and Cameroon have a higher average wealth index than their 
Muslim counterparts.  In Cameroon, the average wealth index score for non-
Muslim women is 4.49, representing the wealthiest cohort. However, when 
looking at marital status, Muslim women in both Senegal and Cameroon are 
more likely to be married or cohabiting with their partner. All means differences 
are statistically significant at the .000 level.  
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Table 6.1. Means differences in control variables between Muslims and non-Muslims, Cameroon 2004 & Senegal 2005
Highest level of education 1 Urban resident
Senegal
Muslim 0.48 0.42
Non-Muslim 1.03 0.60
Cameroon
Muslim 1.16 0.44
Non-Muslim 1.72 1.00
* All means differences are statistically significant at the .000 level. 
1 0=No Education, 1=Incomplete Primary, 2=Complete Primary
2 (1=Lo, 5=Hi)
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Religion and Women’s control over Household Decisions  
A series of logistic regressions were used to examine the relationship between 
religion and women’s control over household decisions in Cameroon and 
Senegal. Table 6.2 shows the effect of religion on a variety of outcomes, including 
women’s control over deciding their own health, large household purchases, 
daily household purchases, visits outside of the home, and the food they cook 
daily. For each outcome of interest, I proceeded in a two-step fashion, first 
modeling the impact of religion on the main independent variable of interest 
alone, and then creating a second model that included standard socio-
demographic controls1. The main independent variable of interest in all models is 
whether or not the respondent is Muslim. A positive beta coefficient and odds 
ratio implies that a Muslim respondent is more likely to have no control over the 
decision at question. This regression incorporates controls for a variety of socio-
demographic characteristics, which are: whether the respondent lives in an urban 
area, if the respondent is currently married or cohabiting with a partner, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Already, its been argued that a narrow Islamic explanation of fertility differences has been 
proven as insufficient in numerous studies. What, then, may be the explanation for statistically 
significant differences between Muslim and non-Muslim populations? McQuillan (2004) touched 
upon this point in his paper, acknowledging the partial influence of Islam in encouraging 
pronatalist attitudes of Muslims, but also pointing out that the nature and extent of Islam’s 
influence is conditioned by the context. Indeed, “other political, cultural, socio-economic, and 
historical factors interact with the relationship” between Islam and fertility, making it difficult to 
untangle and isolate religion’s specific influence (161).  
 Furthermore, individual characteristics can influence a woman’s fertility, such as 
education or place of residence (DeRose and Ezeh 2010). It has been previously demonstrated 
in Senegal that “those who live in Dakar and are more educated are more favorable to woman’s 
individual rights to use family planning.” (Bop 2005, 19) Similarly, one study on the effect of 
radio promotion of family planning in the Gambia found that better educated individuals 
demonstrated an increased uptake in contraceptive services when compared to their less-educated 
counterparts (Valente et al 1994, 98) and the same relationship was found in Iran, as well. In Iran, 
female literacy has increased to over 75% of Iranian women, and this has been proven to 
contribute to the increase of contraceptive use (Roudi-Fahimi 2002, 6).  	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respondent’s education level, the respondent’s wealth index, and the 
respondent’s age.  
 The first relationship examined was between religion and the 
respondent’s control over her own health. Muslim respondents in Cameroon are 
2.65 times more likely to have no control over their own health than non-Muslim 
respondents, whereas the relationship is the same, but weaker in Senegal. 
Senegalese Muslims are 2.19 times more likely to have no control over their own 
health than their non-Muslim counterparts. This differentiation remains the same 
after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics (wealth, education, 
relationship status, and age) although in both cases the influence of religion is 
lessened a small amount after taking these factors into account. In Cameroon, 
Muslim women are 2.38 times more likely than non-Muslims to have no control 
over their own health, versus Muslim women in Senegal, who are only 1.86 times 
more likely than their non-Muslim counterparts to have no control over making 
decisions regarding their own health. In both Cameroon and Senegal, the effect 
of being Muslim on deciding one’s own health remains statistically significant, 
even after controlling for all socio-demographic variables included.  
 In regards to decisions about large purchases and visits, the trends are the 
same as in decisions regarding one’s own health. Both before and after 
controlling for wealth, age, education, urban residence, and marital status, 
religion has a stronger influence on decision-making power in Cameroon than in 
Senegal. In both countries, Muslim women are more likely than their non-
Muslim counterparts to have no control over the decisions, and the relationship 
is once again statistically significant across the board.  
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 This trend varies slightly when examining decisions about daily 
purchases and cooking. Once more, the influence of religion is much stronger in 
Cameroon than in Senegal both before and after controlling for socio-
demographic characteristics, but in Cameroon, the influence of religion becomes 
stronger after controlling for the variables. Muslim women in Cameroon are 3.61 
more likely than their non-Muslim counterparts to have no control over daily 
purchases after controlling for wealth, age, education, urban residence, and 
marital status, whereas they were only 3.30 times more likely before introducing 
controls to the model. This is a divergent trend from all other contexts, and was 
not echoed in Senegal, where the strength of religion as a predictor decreased 
slightly once controls were introduced. Once again, the relationship of religion 
remained statistically significant in all cases.  
 In regards to decisions about cooking, the influence of religion on 
women’s control over decision-making remains stronger in Cameroon than in 
Senegal, but in both cases, the relationship between religion and decisions about 
cooking became stronger after controlling for all socio-demographic 
characteristics. In Cameroon, the odds ratio increases from 1.62 to 2.39, a 
substantial increase, and religion remained significant throughout. Similarly, in 
Senegal the odds ratio increases from 0.96 to 1.07, a slightly smaller change, but 
notably a shift from being associated with more control over cooking decisions to 
being less likely to have control over cooking decisions. However, the 
relationship between religion and control over cooking decisions in Senegal is 
insignificant both before and after introducing the controls.  
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Table 6.2. Logistic Regression Results of Relationship Between Religion and Women's Control
CAMEROON
B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. 
Religious Variables
Respondent is Muslim 0.98 *** 2.65 0.87 *** 2.38 1.04 *** 2.82 0.96 *** 2.60 1.19 *** 3.30 1.29 *** 3.61 0.97 *** 2.65 0.93 *** 2.53 0.48 *** 1.62 0.87 *** 2.39
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics
Lives in urban area -0.31 *** 0.73 -0.18 *** 0.84 -0.18 *** 0.84 -0.24 *** 0.79 -0.01 0.99
Currently married or cohabiting 0.18 *** 1.19 -0.25 *** 0.78 -0.84 *** 0.43 -0.30 *** 0.74 -1.55 *** 0.21
Highest education level -0.24 *** 0.78 -0.30 *** 0.74 -0.36 *** 0.70 -0.26 *** 0.77 -0.09 * 0.91
Wealth index -0.03 0.98 -0.03 0.97 -0.06 * 0.94 -0.03 0.97 0.00 1.00
Age -0.09 *** 0.91 -0.09 *** 0.91 -0.11 *** 0.90 -0.09 *** 0.92 -0.11 *** 0.90
Partners* socio-demographic characteristics
Highest education level
Constant 0.52 3.61 0.52 3.91 -0.01 4.23 -0.03 3.09 -0.78 3.06
Numer of Cases
-2 Log likelihood
Nagelkerke R 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.23 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.38
SENEGAL
B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. 
Religious Variables
Respondent is Muslim 0.79 *** 2.19 0.62 *** 1.86 0.55 *** 1.74 0.11 *** 1.56 0.42 *** 1.52 0.38 *** 1.47 0.49 *** 1.62 0.41 *** 1.51 -0.04 0.96 0.07 1.07
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics
Lives in urban area -0.47 *** 0.63 0.07 *** 0.63 -0.27 *** 0.76 -0.15 *** 0.86 0.07 1.07
Currently married or cohabiting 0.31 *** 1.36 0.07 *** 0.73 -0.82 *** 0.44 -0.37 *** 0.69 -1.83 *** 0.16
Highest education level -0.18 *** 0.84 0.04 * 0.92 -0.06 0.94 -0.14 *** 0.87 0.00 1.00
Wealth index 0.02 1.02 0.03 1.01 -0.04 0.96 -0.03 0.97 -0.04 * 0.96
Age -0.08 *** 0.92 0.00 *** 0.93 -0.07 *** 0.93 -0.06 *** 0.94 -0.07 *** 0.93
Partners* socio-demographic characteristics
Highest education level
Constant 0.81 3.34 1.34 0.16 1.01 4.10 0.53 2.89 -0.16 3.00
Numer of Cases
-2 Log likelihood
Nagelkerke R 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.34
Respondent has no say in their….
Respondent has no say in their….
Own health Large purchases Daily purchases Visits Cooking 
Own health Large purchases Daily purchases Visits Cooking 
10656
13420
10656
11866
10656
13358
10656
11672
14602
13470
14602
12311
14602
11475
14602
10457
14602
14462
14602
12894
14602
16972
10656
14238
10656
11608
10656
14410
10656
13477
10656
10106
10656
12776
14602
15762
14602
20066
14602
15801
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2. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
Qualitative results stem from the focus group sessions conducted in both 
Cameroon and Senegal. A variety of themes emerged during the discussions that 
were relevant to understanding the relationship between Islam and decision-
making processes within the household. These themes, discussed in detail below, 
include Muslim women’s decision-making influence; the importance of partner 
dialogue; children’s health and economic decisions; and economic decisions. This 
section concludes with a discussion of regional variations in these patterns. 
Muslim Women’s Decision-making Influence in Cameroon and 
Senegal 
The focus group discussions and individual interviews shed significant light on 
the question of Muslim women’s status in Cameroon and Senegal and on the 
complexity within this question. In Cameroon, both local religious leaders and 
individual women spoke to this concern, offering dissimilar explanations based 
on subtle differences in interpretations of their religion. For instance, local 
religious leaders in Yaoundé provided somewhat paradoxical assessments. 
Cheikh Baba Moussa stated that, “The status of women in the Muslim 
community here is fairly evolved. She goes to school, she is employed, and is an 
integral part of society,” whereas his colleague emphasized the domination and 
authority reserved for men in relationships, stating that a woman, “should obey 
you in strict compliance with recommendations of Islam. You become mutually 
accountable for your actions and the woman must have confidence in your 
protection and authority. She must not go out without permission,” implying an 
overall hierarchical relationship between men and women. However, the 
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restrictions mentioned appear to contradict the subsequent statement that, “In 
marriage, both spouses . . . are equal before God. The man should not take the 
opportunity to keep his wife a prisoner in the home as a captive. He must allow 
his wife to visit his parents, friends and acquaintances . . . to attend prayers at the 
mosque ... If she wants to lead a revenue generating activity, he must also grant 
her permission.” While there seem to be inconsistencies in these statements, they 
were not viewed as such by Muslim religious leaders interviewed in Yaoundé, 
who specified that Islam fundamentally recognizes the equality of men and 
women, while simultaneously giving to each a very precise role.  
In terms of a woman’s decision-making power, subtle disagreements 
emerged in terms of whether or not women are implicated in decision-making. 
In Cameroon, focus group participants expressed a few common threads. For 
instance, several women expressed the opinion that, “women don’t have 
decision-making power in their families. They don’t participate actively. The 
priority is generally left to the man: one says that he has authoritative power.” 
This was rooted in religion through various other statements that emphasized 
the overall authority of men over women. As another participant emphasized, 
“concerning Islam, in the home, the woman doesn’t have a decision to take 
because Islam has decided all. The woman has her rights and duties. Islam 
prescribes what the man must do and what the woman must do. We know that 
the woman in her home must take care of the house and of the children.” 
Another woman echoed this sentiment, stating, “Generally, women don’t make 
decisions. That is the domain reserved for men. They participate only in 
managing the house as the mother and woman of the household.”  These voices 
are in accordance with the religious leaders who argued that, while men and 
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women are equal before God, their equality does not indicate sameness. Women 
hold a different role in their families and communities than men, and that role 
exists in the home.  
Furthermore, while women do play a role, they must always be in 
agreement with their husbands on key decisions. This reflects the regression 
results summarized in Table 6.2, which showed that being Muslim is associated 
with less of a voice in key household decisions. This is accepted as a natural 
dynamic, which is demonstrated by female focus group participants like one 
individual who stated, “as far as I am concerned, the woman can make all the 
decisions if and only if there is agreement in the couple.” Cheikh Baba Moussa in 
Cameroon agreed with this sentiment, stating that “the last word naturally falls 
to the man; but there must be dialogue between the man and his wife because he 
is not the only one in the house; the man and the woman are both responsible for 
the home.” The emphasis on dialogue does imply that women have a say in 
household decisions, but with the stipulation that men always have the last 
word. 
Similar threads were seen in the Senegalese context. It’s important to note 
that in Senegal, focus groups included several male participants, which makes it 
more difficult to compare findings from each country. However, the points 
brought up in Senegal still have illustrative value when looking at how they 
compare to the data analysis, which revealed a low level of decision-making 
power for Muslim women, as in Cameroon. As one male participant said, 
“religion has a big impact, and it influences [decision-making] a lot. A really 
religious family, it is in this family that the decision is most of the time made by a 
man.”  However, it is critical to distinguish causation and correlation. While 
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religion appears to exert this effect on women, it is not necessarily the religious 
doctrine responsible, but religious persons interpreting scripture in one 
particular way. Many participants expressed concern over the ways in which 
their religion is interpreted and how it influenced women’s experiences. As one 
female participant articulated: 
This is a problem in Senegal. We talk a lot about religion, but we 
don’t know it well, the Holy Qur’an. Islam says you should follow 
your husband if he leads you in the right way, but if your husband 
tells you ‘go and buy alcohol, we’re going to drink and dance,’ you 
don’t have to follow him. If he tells you ‘go and buy sexy clothes, or 
sell yourself,’ you don’t have to do it . . . Even if it is time to pray, 
he doesn’t have the right to ask you to come and cook for him. You 
are not an animal. If he is leading you in the right way, follow him. 
If he doesn’t, even divorce is acceptable in Islam. If he is behaving 
like a non-Muslim, you have to leave him. 
 
This particular participant made an important point that was similarly expressed 
by religious leaders in Cameroon. There is a difference between Islam and 
Muslims. It is not Islam that enforces particular social roles and relationships, but 
adherents to Islam attempting to interpret and live in accordance to the scripture. 
This can partly account for the tremendous diversity in interpretations regarding 
women’s roles, and how Islam has been used as a tool in both fundamental and 
progressive movements throughout the Muslim world.  
Demonstrating the diversity of opinions on this subject amongst Muslims, 
some focus group participants in Senegal offered an even more progressive 
interpretation of Islam’s stance on women. Instead of emphasizing a women’s 
requirement to gain approval from her husband in decision-making, one 
participant felt that every decision involves equal cooperation:  
Concerning decision-making in the household we know that for 
Islam there is not a unilateral decision, neither the husband nor the 
wife . . . takes a decision. All rests on the agreement, the spouse and 
her husband must agree, there is not a decision to make all alone. 
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Despite speaking of a masculine authority, it is not to say that the 
man must decide because he is the head of the household. Every 
part of a couple has a responsibility. 
 
While many women expressed this opinion, there were several others who 
argued in favor of women’s influence within the household via discussion and 
dialogue, and this was often tied directly to Islam. One female participant in 
Cameroon claimed, “In Islam, the man and the woman are complementary. It 
isn’t a question of the authority or the question of being subordinate to someone. 
When a man has a decision, he shares it with his wife.” The idea of 
complementarities was echoed throughout all four focus groups in both 
Cameroon and Senegal.  
In Senegal, one male focus group participant went as far as to claim the 
authority of women over their husbands, saying, ““I think most of the time . . . 
women take the decisions. Because, they say that wives have their secret 
weapons to convince their husbands . . . I think that man is the weaker sex. What 
is important in the family is the dialogue between husbands and wives.” This 
quote illustrates two important points. First of all, it reiterates the theme of 
dialogue between man and wife that came up throughout all focus groups, 
regardless of who has the last word. More importantly, however, it suggests a 
strong influence of women on household decisions. That being said, one 
woman’s opinion directly opposed this argument. A married Muslim woman 
made the following statement: 
People are talking about women’s emancipation, but you can see in 
some fields, and how I understand it is . . . it stops at the front of 
your house. It doesn’t go inside the house because that’s the 
religious belief. Man, even if you are richer than your husband, you 
are always behind him. That’s how we were educated. And if you 
learn the Qur’an, it tells you that you have to follow your husband 
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because the paradise of a woman is in his husband’s hand. That’s 
what the Qur’an says. 
 
This individual’s statement articulated a distinction between women’s parity in 
the community or society and women’s parity within her household. In her 
opinion, and in the opinion of several other participants in Senegal and 
Cameroon, both women and men, women do not have the same authority within 
their household as their husbands, and this is due to specific interpretations of 
the Qur’an and the doctrine of Islam.  
Partner Dialogue 
In discussing patterns of decision-making in both Senegal and Cameroon, the 
need for dialogue emerged as one persistent theme. Many individuals stressed 
the importance of partner dialogue when making decisions. Both men and 
women in Senegal emphasized this ideal, as illustrated in one man’s assertion 
that, “marriage is going to be like a partnership. Health is something that 
concerns both – the woman and the husband.” Several other participants 
expressed this sentiment, like one man who looked forward to sharing all 
decisions with his spouse, saying, “decisions should be shared by both the 
husband and wife. I think there should be a consensus in decisions, because the 
benefit is being shared by women and men.” Several male participants similarly 
emphasized their desire to share decisions with their partners. 
However, despite the progressive attitude demonstrated by focus group 
participants in Dakar, it was also emphasized that this was not a universal 
tendency. One woman opposed the opinion that genuine cooperation and 
dialogue exists within households, saying: 
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People don’t apply parity, maybe when it comes to learning, but 
when it comes to life in the couple, the men are more powerful than 
women. Don’t forget that we are in Africa, we are Senegalese . . . 
Despite all of the struggle to better life for women, it is in vain. 
Look at the way our mothers are treated. 
 
The diversity in opinions expressed above underscores the complexity of the 
issue at hand. It also demonstrates the importance of context. Participants in 
these focus groups tended to be highly educated and young and all lived in 
Dakar, Senegal’s capital city. Their experiences differ from those without formal 
education living in a rural region of the country. However, gaining an 
understanding of the ways in which individuals interact with their context is 
important in grasping the meaning behind statistical trends and relationships.  
Children’s Health and Education Decisions 
In both focus group discussions in Cameroon, education was identified as a key 
area in which women exhibit substantial influence and control. Focus group 
participants held the role of educator in high regard, as evidenced by statements 
like, “Muslim women participate in a grand measure where they are the primary 
educators of the children. Educating the children is nothing easy,” and:   
Islam grants the woman a job more noble and important, which is 
to educate the children . . . the woman produces the men and 
women for the society of tomorrow. I think that it is more 
important than that of the man . . . she has her place and that place 
is truly very important in the home. 
 
In the context of Cameroon, caring for the children was seen as the primary, and 
perhaps the only, domain exclusive to a woman. One focus group participant 
illustrated this singular role when she said, “the Muslim woman makes fewer 
decisions than the man in terms of the household. She participates, however, in 
making decisions for educating the children.” Another participant backed her 
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position up, saying, “In terms of the household affairs, the woman can make a 
decision regarding the health or the education of the children. The other domains 
are the man’s.” These statements emphasize the precise roles perceived as 
belonging to men and women according to interpretation of Islam. Religious 
authorities echoed this sentiment as well. For instance, Cheikh Baba Moussa 
asserted that the woman’s role is to give birth and subsequently educate the 
children, since the “first education of the children is in the home.” There was no 
disagreement expressed in regards to this particular role.  
 In Senegal, health decisions played an equally large role in focus group 
discussions. The emerging theme in regards to control over health decisions was 
that women tend to exert control over their children’s health because they spend 
the most time with them. One male focus group discussant said, “Fathers, they 
are busy. The mothers stay with the children, so it is the mothers who take the 
decision to bring the children to the hospital.” This distribution of responsibility 
was often attributed to the woman’s thorough understanding and concern for 
her children. For instance, another participant stated that fathers are responsible 
for family decisions in Senegal, but the mother is the one who is most worried 
about the child and accordingly takes action on a child’s health. Thus, he 
articulated, “it shows that [women] have a really great role in our society. 
Sometimes the men seem to be in control, but to me, women play a greater role 
in the family” due to their responsibility toward the family’s health.  
 While the husband’s approval over decisions remained an important 
theme, one male focus group participant told a story that illustrated the influence 
his mother played in ensuring his health as a child:  
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In my case, when I was a child I was very sick and I used to go with 
my mother to the hospital. One day I had to be operated on, but my 
father said we had to . . . believe in God, and if I believe, I will live, 
but if I die, we cannot change it. But my mother said she had to 
follow what the doctor said, that the only thing that could save me 
would be to take me out of the country . . . by her own way of 
thinking and her own involvement, she brought me out of Senegal, 
and that’s why I am here. 
 
If his mother had not acted in opposition to her husband’s wishes, that 
participant would not have survived to adulthood. Clearly, his mother exerted 
tremendous influence over his health. This particular participant emphasized 
that his mother was enabled to act in this way because she lives in Dakar. Urban 
women, he argued, have more agency than rural women in regards to these 
types of decisions. 
Economic Decisions 
In both contexts, the role of women in economic decisions was given some 
attention, and there was little apparent disagreement on the topic. In Senegal, 
one male participant identified precise and complementary economic roles for 
both the husband and wife, saying, “for finance, generally the father brings home 
the money and he gives it to the mother and the mother makes all the plans for 
what the family needs.” Thus, the father generates the income and the wife 
delegates the finances in order to care for the household. This statement implies 
that the woman has complete control over necessary household purchases. 
However, this contradicts the regression results, which implied that Muslim 
women in the Senegalese context are significantly less likely to have authority in 
regards to household purchases.  
The influence of religion on women’s purchasing power was not as strong 
in Senegal as in Cameroon. Despite these quantitative results, qualitative 
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discussion painted a slightly different picture. One participant in Cameroon 
specified that women contribute in economic decision-making, especially when 
their husbands aren’t generating much income themselves. In fact, “this is 
proven in the Muslim community where one sees many more women who 
practice in the informal sector.” This is an interesting assertion, which clearly 
diverges from the regression results. Not only does this participant claim that 
women manage household income, it also implies the role of women in 
generating income. Another participant agreed with this opinion, stating: 
For Islam like the Prophet Muhammad said, the man is destined to 
work outside and to bring money into the home; the woman must 
take care of the children, her husband, and the home. All that the 
man brings in, the woman manages. In our home, the man has the 
responsibility to work but that doesn’t mean the woman can’t 
work. 
 
Both of these statements define the specific roles of men and women, but they 
also imply women’s influence over household finances, as well as the 
permissibility of women’s employment. In processing this contradiction, it is 
important to note that the women making these statements live in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon’s capital city. As previously discussed, contextual factors are 
incredibly important to consider when examining any relationship.  
Regional Variation 
As previously mentioned, an important consideration to take into account is that 
all qualitative work was conducted in the capital cities of Senegal and Cameroon. 
In discussing decision-making with participants, the unique context in which 
they were embedded played a large role in dialogue. Generally, participants 
emphasized a divide between urban and rural experiences of women’s status. 
This was an especially strong theme in Senegal, where participants presented a 
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slightly negative opinion of their rural counterparts. One male participant 
emphasized the urban-rural divide in terms of women’s experiences when he 
said, “in the cities, you can see both the wife and the husband go to work. If you 
go to the village, it is not the same.” In many ways, women residing in Dakar 
were believed to have greater opportunities. Another male participant echoed 
this when he explained, “In Dakar, things are changing right now. Women are 
more involved in the family decisions, contrary to in the countryside where 
women don’t have school. They just follow their husbands; they don’t have the 
right to make decisions.” Decision-making power, he argued, depends on one’s 
region and the dominant cultural influences there.  
One prominent component of this regional and cultural differentiation is 
ethnicity. In Senegal’s capital the dominant ethnic group is the Wolof. However, 
in rural areas, other ethnic groups predominate. Thus, the two factors – 
rural/urban and ethnicity – are slightly confounded and are difficult to 
disentangle. One male focus group participant   
In terms of decisions, it is different from one ethnic group to 
another. For example, if you go to the North of Senegal, and the 
Pular ethnic group . . .within these communities, decisions are most 
of the time made by men, because it is part of the culture. The 
people in the North are closer to the religion and the religion say, in 
the Qur’an, that the women are always behind. It is different from 
the Wolof ethnic group. 
 
Clearly, religion is believed to play a large role in determining women’s decision-
making power. However, it is impossible to understand this influence without 
looking at region, ethnicity, education, and several other socio-demographic 
factors, as demonstrated in the diversity of opinions expressed on the topic.   
   
 
45
	  
7. FINDINGS: ISLAM AND FERTILITY 
1. QUANITATIVE RESULTS 
Examining questions of religion, gender and decision-making control provides a 
framework in which to examine more specific decision-making patterns, 
specifically relating to fertility in this study. Table 7.1 directly pertains to family 
planning in Cameroon and Senegal. In both contexts, around 90% of respondents 
reported having knowledge of modern methods of contraceptives (i.e. the Pill, 
IUD, etc.). Despite a high level of awareness of contraceptive methods, 
consumption of modern contraceptive methods was significantly less in both 
cases, especially in Senegal. In Cameroon, 14.0% of married women reported 
current use of a modern method of contraceptive. While this is a relatively low 
figure, it is double the usage in Senegal, where only 7.2% of all respondents 
reported using a modern contraceptive method.  
The data available on fertility decisions is limited, unfortunately, making 
it impossible to mimic the decision-making regressions. However, there is data 
available on fertility outcomes, attitudes, and knowledge, which are used now to 
examine the effect of being Muslim on fertility experiences in Cameroon and 
Senegal. 
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Table 7.1. Knowledge & Use Contraceptives, Cameroon 2004 & Senegal 2005
% Knows Modern Method % Uses Modern Method
Senegal 90.1 7.2
Cameroon 90.7 14.0
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The logistic regression results of the relationship between religion and 
women’s fertility knowledge and attitudes in Cameroon and Senegal are 
summarized in Table 7.2. This table shows the effect of religion on women’s 
knowledge and use of modern contraceptive methods, husband’s approval of 
family planning, respondents’ approval of family planning, and fertility 
outcomes (total children ever born). The independent variable in this regression 
is whether or not the respondent is Muslim. A positive beta coefficient and odds 
ratio implies that a Muslim respondent is more likely to exhibit the behavior 
implied by the dependent variable. As in the previous regression findings, 
models were built in a two step approach: first solely controlling for religious 
affiliation and then building a second model that included controls for the 
following socio-demographic characteristics: whether the respondent lives in an 
urban area, if the respondent is currently married or cohabiting with a partner, as 
well as the respondent’s education level, wealth index, and age.  
The first regression examines the effect of being Muslim on contraceptive 
use. Before introducing variables, Muslim women were significantly more likely 
to use modern contraceptive methods than their non-Muslim counterparts in 
Cameroon (OR = 1.867). After controls, however, the significance of the 
relationship was diminished. In Senegal, both before and after controls, Muslim 
women were significantly less likely than their non-Muslim counterparts to use 
modern contraceptive methods (OR = .39; .494, respectively).   
The second regression looks at how being Muslim affects knowledge of 
modern contraceptive methods. In Cameroon before controls, Muslim women 
were once again significantly more likely than their non-Muslim counterparts to 
know of a modern method (OR = 7.01). Despite this strong correlation before 
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controls, once introduced to the model, the relationship and significance were 
diminished. In this mode, education level was significantly implicated (OR = 
7.74), implying education’s influence rather than religion. In Senegal, Muslim 
women were significantly less likely to know of modern contraceptives (OR = 
.341) prior to controlling, and this once again remained significant after controls.  
In looking at attitudes toward family planning, regressions were run on 
both the husband’s approval of family planning and the respondent’s approval 
of family planning. In Cameroon, Muslim respondents were significantly more 
likely to have husbands who approved of family planning (OR = 1.94). Once 
again, however, the control variables diminished significance. In Senegal, the 
picture remains quite different. Muslim women in Senegal were significantly less 
likely to have husbands who approved of family planning (OR = 0.43), a 
relationship that persisted after controls (OR = 0.59).  
In terms of the respondent’s approval of family planning, Cameroonian 
Muslim respondents were more likely than their non-Muslim counterparts to 
approve of family planning (OR = 1.819). After controlling, however, Muslim 
women were significantly less likely to approve of family planning. In Senegal, 
both before and after introducing controls, Muslim women were significantly 
less likely to approve of family planning than their non-Muslim counterparts. 
The final regression examined fertility outcomes of Muslim women in 
both countries. Being Muslim was negatively correlated with having more 
children in Cameroon, an outcome that is perhaps surprising based on previous 
studies. In Senegal, however, being Muslim was positively correlated with 
having children before controls. However, significance was diminished once 
controls were introduced to the model. 
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Table 7.2 Logistic Regression Results of Relationship Between Religion and Fertility
CAMEROON
Uses Modern Method Knows Modern Method Hubsand approves of FP Respondent approves of FP Total Children Ever Born
B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B B
Religious Variables
Respondent is Muslim 0.62 *** 1.87 -0.11 0.89 1.95 *** 7.01 -0.29 0.75 0.66 *** 1.94 -0.14 0.87 0.60 *** 1.82 -0.31 *** 0.73 -1.06 *** -0.34 ***
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics
Lives in urban area 0.30 *** 1.35 0.52 *** 1.68 -0.15 ** 0.86 -0.08 0.92 -0.13 **
Currently married or cohabiting 0.13 1.14 0.66 *** 1.93 0.16 ** 1.18 0.66 ***
Highest education level 0.74 *** 2.09 2.05 *** 7.74 0.91 *** 2.49 1.11 *** 3.04 -0.45 ***
Wealth index 0.26 *** 1.30 0.33 *** 1.40 0.28 *** 1.32 0.24 *** 1.27 -0.14 ***
Age 0.01 1.01 0.02 *** 1.02 -0.01 *** 0.99 0.00 1.00
Constant -1.89 -4.21 2.19 -1.27 -0.54 -1.94 0.49 -1.56 2.87 -2.17
Number of Cases 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656 10656
-2 Log likelihood 8577 7790 6467 4657 9473 8278 13936 11888
Nagelkerke R 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.25 0.01 a 0.60 a
SENEGAL
Respondent….
Uses Modern Method Knows Modern Method Hubsand approves of FP Respondent approves of FP Total Children Ever Born
B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B O.R. B B
Religious Variables
Respondent is Muslim -0.94 *** 0.39 -0.71 *** 0.49 -1.08 *** 0.34 -0.74 *** 0.47 -0.84 *** 0.43 -0.52 *** 0.60 -0.58 *** 0.56 -0.31 *** 0.73 0.41 *** -0.13
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics
Lives in urban area 0.59 *** 1.81 0.54 *** 1.72 0.44 *** 1.55 0.36 *** 1.43
Currently married or cohabiting 2.53 *** 12.60 1.43 *** 4.17 0.88 *** 2.41 2.75 ***
Highest education level 0.62 *** 1.87 0.70 *** 2.01 0.64 *** 1.89 0.54 *** 1.72 -0.63 ***
Wealth index 0.22 *** 1.25 0.24 *** 1.27 0.22 *** 1.24 0.10 *** 1.10 -0.14 ***
Age -5.42 *** 0.00 -0.13 **
Constant -1.68 3.26 0.95 -0.47 -1.88 0.30 2.34 1.87
Number of Cases 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602 14602
-2 Log likelihood 7490 6476 9365 8494 10700 9764 19962 18887
Nagelkerke R 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.00 a 0.27 a
a Denotes r-squared. Results for this model stem from a standard OLS regression, since the outcome variable (CEB) is continuous. This is also why there are no odds ratios reported for this model.
Respondent….
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2. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
In discussing fertility attitudes and decisions in Cameroon and Senegal, multiple 
questions were examined. Fertility decision themes that emerged included 
whether fertility preferences were discussed and who had the authority to make 
fertility decisions. Topics relating to fertility preferences included the 
permissibility of family planning according to Islam and the ways in which 
education, polygamy and regional differences factor into these discussions. 
Below, I present the findings as they emerged from various questions.  
Is family planning discussed? 
Whether or not family planning is discussed amongst spouses played a larger 
role in Senegalese focus group discussions than in Cameroon. However, one 
participant in Cameroon expressed the opinion that, “generally the number of 
children is not mentioned in discussions between couples who practice my 
religion (Islam).”  In general, participants in Cameroon seemed to be more united 
in their opinions on family planning and fertility control, which may account for 
the absence of discussion on this topic during focus groups. This was not the case 
in Senegal, however, where participants debated this issue in both discussions. 
 When asked whether or not spouses discussed family planning, one 
informant agreed it was critical to have, “discussion between you and your 
husband because if you don’t have your husband’s blessing you don’t do it 
[family planning] . . . It’s a marriage decision, between you and your partner so 
you have to discuss.” As was observed in examining household decision-making 
dynamics, this opinion illustrates the themes of partner dialogue and ultimate 
submission to the husband’s wishes. If the husband is opposed to family 
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planning, she said, then the wife must obey his wishes. However, another male 
participant spoke to the wife’s ability to influence fertility decisions, further 
underscoring the importance of discussion: “It is up to the wife to speak with her 
husband and to explain the problem to him. And if you love your wife, if you 
deeply share your life with her, you’ve got to understand her. And having this 
kind of process creates a nice familial atmosphere.” Throughout all discussions 
and interviews, participants raised this idea, demonstrating once again a more 
progressive attitude toward marital relationships than might be expected based 
on data alone.  
Who decides? 
In examining general household decisions, dialogue was emphasized in both 
countries. However, the man’s opinion remained dominant in most cases, as 
evidenced by the regression results and several focus group participants. Does 
this trend remain when examining fertility decisions?  
As is to be expected, participants disagreed on this point. However, many 
women in Cameroon expressed a sense of agency and autonomy in regards to 
family planning decisions. As one women explained: 
More and more, women are strongly implicated in making the 
decision because they are the ones who carry the children. It is their 
health that is the question. For my part, I can plan my births 
without talking to my spouse if he cannot understand that it is for 
my health and the well being of the children. 
 
This woman felt that she had control because each pregnancy directly affected 
her physical health. She expressed a sense of control over her own body, a 
sentiment supported by another woman’s assertion that, “the woman must also 
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make the decision about the number of children that she wishes to have because 
it is she who suffers with the children.” 
 This opinion was not universally shared, however, as articulated in the 
statement that, “contrary to what my sister said, it is always the man who 
decides the number of children under the pretext that it is he who brings home 
money. She participates more in the health plan and the education because of her 
position close to the children.” Here, the man’s position as household head and 
provider strengthens his authority in most decisions, including fertility. 
In Senegal, the most commonly expressed opinion was that the husband 
maintains control over fertility decisions.  One female participant said, “I think it 
is the man . . . Women are trying to have their voice, and it is very difficult, and 
that’s why there are many divorces today. Men are not psychologically prepared 
to accept this kind of situation and women are tied to follow their husbands.” 
Another female participant provided insight into the consequences of this 
dynamic, saying: 
It is man who has authority. We were in a village, and we saw 
women with lots of health problems like anemia because they don’t 
eat well, they don’t feed themselves properly and they have many 
children, but they can’t reduce the number of children they have 
because they just have to go on what the husband says, so they 
keep giving birth even if they know that it is not healthy for them. 
 
Although this type of situation was acknowledged as a reality in Senegal, many 
participants expressed their disapproval of this dynamic. The general consensus 
was that, in matters of health, the woman should be enabled to exert control over 
her own fertility, regardless of her husband’s wishes.  
Is family planning permissible according to Islam? 
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The permissibility of family planning according to Islam is a highly controversial 
topic amongst individuals, despite the overall approval of family planning by 
Islamic jurists. Many informants in Cameroon believe that Islam expressly 
prohibits family planning, as one woman explained when she said, “The 
utilization of preservative, taking pills and other injections are prohibited 
because it is Allah who gives the children. In his mercy, the needs of the man are 
always provided.” Because the Qur’an says God will provide all for his 
adherents, many Muslim individuals believed it would be wrong to control 
fertility, which essentially expresses doubt in God’s ability to provide for the 
faithful. Another woman echoed this, saying “The Muslim woman cannot limit 
births. All is the will of Allah, to Allah to decide what he wants for us, without 
the need of our consent.” Participants in Cameroon generally accepted this 
opinion, although a few specific exceptions were articulated. 
One circumstance in which family planning was deemed permissible was 
in the case of a mother’s health. As one woman explained, “There is a condition . 
. . for which religion is in favor of family planning. That is the case where health 
is at risk. If a new pregnancy will endanger the life of the woman, a doctor must 
take that under consideration.” Protecting the mother’s health was universally 
agreed upon as a reason to use family planning.  
 Additionally, some women believed temporary methods of birth control 
are permissible for the purpose of spacing pregnancies. For example, one woman 
argued that, “if family planning signifies spacing births and not limiting them, to 
do that there are certain methods that are permitted like coitus interruptus 
[withdrawal], condoms, pills and Norplant.“ However, all participants rejected 
permanent measures like sterilization.  
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  The opinion of religious leaders in Cameroon differed slightly both from 
the women surveyed and from one another. One imam expressed very strict 
guidelines to contraceptive use: 
The religion is against these methods that are not natural. And the 
methods must not be taken by young, unmarried girls. In the 
marriage, there are methods that could be medically recommended. 
The woman cannot make the decision without her husband’s 
consent. Between two births, there is a very reliable birth spacing 
method that has been proven: breastfeeding. 
 
However, in the same religious community, Cheikh Baba Moussa articulated a 
much more permissive stance on family planning, in contradiction to his 
colleague. The Cheikh believed that Islam did not forbid family planning in any 
circumstance, save limiting births, once more underscoring the diversity of 
opinions and interpretations that exist among Muslims.  
One important specification made by both individual women and the 
religious leaders was that family planning is only permissible for married 
women. It was agreed that no unmarried woman should use family planning, 
because that implies she is having sex out of wedlock, which was generally 
forbidden. One woman stated that, “it is essential to specify that Islam is not 
against family planning. Religion disapproves of the young who are not married 
using family planning. It is reserved for married women.” For unmarried 
women, “the only type of method she can use is abstinence,” according to 
multiple participants.   
The discussion on family planning permissiveness in Senegal brought up 
several similar opinions.  However, one point that got emphasized in this context 
was how men view family planning in their religious context. One male 
participant, a sociologist, explained his observations from surveying couples on 
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this topic, saying, “In Dakar, Pikine . . . there are some women that talk about 
why their husband didn’t agree about family planning. . . . there are many, many 
men who think that family planning is not compatible with Islam.” This gender 
dimension comes in to play when couples make fertility decisions.  
Another theme that got significant attention in Senegal was the 
importance of enlarging the prophet’s family. Several participants brought this 
up as a reason to forbid family planning. According to one woman, “in the 
Qur’an it is said if you have many children  . . . it’s kind of enlarging the 
prophet’s family.” Another man shared this view, stating, “[family planning] is 
not allowed by the religion . . . .In the Qur’an they say, they want to increase the 
number of Muslims in the world, that’s why they are going to have two or three 
or four wives.” If the Qur’an encourages enlarging the Prophet’s family, then 
family planning acts in direct opposition to this goal.  
What is the role of education? 
As is to be expected, participants believed that education plays a role in attitudes 
about fertility and the women’s autonomy in fertility decision-making processes. 
As one woman in Cameroon stated, “the degree of implication lies at the level of 
emancipation or education. The intellectual Muslim woman more easily adopts 
contraceptive methods than those who did not attend school.” Women are both 
more likely to accept family planning and to determine their own use of 
contraceptive services if they are educated. 
Furthermore, the education of a woman’s husband plays a role. According 
to some women, an educated woman won’t have control over her fertility unless 
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her husband is likewise educated, because “a Muslim man who didn’t attend 
school will not accept all of that [family planning].” 
While the influence of educational attainment is a universal factor in a 
woman’s control over fertility, Muslim women were perceived as more restricted 
than their counterparts because of an overall lower level of education. One 
woman stated, “The Muslim woman is less implicated than women of other 
religions. It it’s the result of low levels of access to education.” Another woman 
echoed this, saying that Muslim women use family planning less than Christians, 
because of a “misunderstanding of Islam and also the submission of Muslim 
women because of their level of education.” Recalling the demographic data 
summarized earlier on in this paper, Muslim women in Cameroon were 
significantly more likely to be educated than their non-Muslim counterparts. 
However, that is an aggregate statistic, and the urban respondents in this study 
may experience a different reality, where non-Muslim women in urban areas are 
more highly educated as a group.  
Education also played a role in rural-urban differences of perceptions of 
family planning, according to several women. Many times, when the differential 
situation of rural women was brought up, it was tied into differences in 
educational attainment. For instance, one woman explained that, “there exists a 
difference in perception between rural areas and urban areas. The rural woman 
is consulted very little and also has little education.” Supporting this statement, 
another woman specified that the three types of women most likely to use family 
planning are, “educated women, women living in an urban area or those who are 
in prenatal consultation during pregnancy.”  
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A similar theme was expressed in Senegal. Across all focus groups and 
interviews, the positive correlation between education and family planning use 
was established. One woman explained the rationale behind this connection, 
saying, “if you are educated, you know that success is very important. Having 
children is good, but if you have children, you put them in good conditions,” 
demonstrating an awareness of economic limitations to fertility.  
Another way in which education came up in discussion in both contexts 
was the importance of providing children with a good education. In Senegal, one 
male participant argued that a couple’s ability to provide for their children 
should be a consideration when discussing fertility. He acknowledged, “If you 
are poor and you have a lot of children . . . they won’t get a good education 
because there are so many. Their father did not give them a good education.” 
This would be a problem, because “in the Qur’an, it says you should give them a 
good education, but if you have many children, how can you give them a good 
education?”  
This sentiment wasn’t conveyed in Cameroon, where one woman stated 
that family planning was only permitted for health reasons, “but when speaking 
of finances, Islam forbids family planning, even when it’s for the children’s 
education.” This can be attributed to the belief that God will provide all 
resources necessary to support, feed, and educate the children.  
What is the role of polygamy? 
An interesting point brought up in both Cameroon and Senegal was how 
polygamy plays into fertility attitudes and decision-making. In Cameroon, 
polygamy was seen as a type of family planning. One woman explained this 
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particularly well when she said, “the woman can decide to space births if her 
husband understands and consents. And in the case where he is not in 
agreement with that decision, the alternative is polygamy: if she is not against 
that situation, polygamy is essential.” Thus, if the woman wants to control her 
fertility while her husband wants to have more children, he can take on another 
wife with whom to continue procreating. Another participant went as far as to 
claim that, “the method already understood by the Muslim religion for spacing 
births is polygamy.” Thus, in Cameroon, polygamy was seen as a natural form of 
birth control.  
In Senegal, polygamy was brought up in a different light. Polygamy, it 
was argued, encourages women to increase their fertility, because “for the 
heritage, the more children you have, the more land or inheritance you get. The 
more boys – and the boys are very important. A boy represents two girls.” Thus, 
in order to gain more inheritance than a co-wife, a woman is encouraged to 
continue having children, specifically boys. Also, if a woman only has girls, this 
tradition of distributing inheritance encourages her to continue bearing children 
in order to have one or more male children.  
Are there regional differences? 
In Senegal, one factor that came up once more in discussing fertility was 
region. Villages were assumed to have lower use of contraceptives by all 
participants because, “if you go to the village, it’s better to have a large family. 
They live from what they work, and it’s not smart to have a big field there and a 
small family, because it won’t help you to succeed in your farm.” In agricultural 
areas, having a large number of children is an asset, because children provide 
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labor. Another participant thought that, in this case, having many children “is 
noble.” However, he recognized that, “the problem is, even if they have a lot of 
children to grow the land, they don’t think about the health of their wives. We 
need to go and sensitize them to this.” This individual, while recognizing the 
economic advantage to having many children, believed the health consequences 
outweighed the benefit, and took a very pro-family planning stance. This 
represents an apparent shift in thinking in urban areas like Dakar, where 
younger generations strive to pursue competitive careers and provide 
adequately for smaller families. In the city, large families were described as a 
burden rather than an asset. For example, one man said, “Dakar is not the same. 
We think that if we have two children it’s better, because it’s expensive.” The 
high cost of living in an urban area, coupled with the industrialized setting, 
makes large families questionable. Furthermore, capital cities such as Dakar and 
Yaoundé are not representative of the rest of the countries being studied, due to 
a number of factors including increased exposure to other parts of the world, 
which may influence attitudes and perceptions of residents. For these reasons, 
the findings here cannot be generalized for the entirety of the countries in 
question, let alone the Muslim world; rather, they represent the specific 
experiences of Muslim men and women in the capital cities of Cameroon and 
Senegal. 
 
8. DISCUSSION 
Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, this paper examined a set of 
four questions concerning religion’s influence – and more specifically, Islam’s 
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influence – on women’s decision-making power in terms of household and 
fertility decisions in Senegal and Cameroon. These questions are: 
1. Do Muslim women have the same level of control over household 
decision-making as their non-Muslim counterparts in Cameroon and 
Senegal? 
2. Does the extent of Muslim women’s participation in key household 
decision-making differ from their participation in reproductive decisions? 
In other words, if these women do not participate in household decision, 
does this non-participation include reproductive health? 
3. Do the rates of contraceptive use and participation in reproductive 
decision-making among Muslim women differ from those observed 
among non-Muslims? 
4. What do Muslim women and men say about the influences and 
prescriptions of religion on the practice of family planning?  
In order to answer these questions, a mixed methods approach was utilized. 
Quantitative research was conducted using the DHS surveys microdata for 
Cameroon (2004) and Senegal (2005). In regards to question one, logistic 
regressions were run looking at the effect of being Muslim on household 
decision-making. The quantitative analysis on household decision-making 
suggested that being Muslim has a significant effect on women’s involvement in 
household decision-making in both Senegal and Cameroon. In both countries, 
Muslim women were significantly less likely than their non-Muslim counterparts 
to have a say  in their own health, large purchases, daily purchases, and visits. 
This significance remained even after controlling for wealth, education, urban 
residency, marital status, and age, underlying the strong influence of religious 
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affiliation on individual outcomes. It is also important to note that this 
relationship was stronger in Cameroon than in Senegal in all cases, indicating 
that Muslim women are more strongly impacted by their religious affiliation in 
Cameroon than in Senegal. While not explicitly tested, this difference may stem 
from the religious composition of the population. The significance of being a 
Muslim may be heightened in a pluralistic setting where Muslims may be 
perceived as minorities. This supports Goldscheider’s minority group status 
theory, which stipulates that minority groups who feel discriminated against 
may experience a greater commitment to group-specific social norms in order to 
ensure group cohesion and preservation.  
Qualitative research conducted in Dakar, Senegal and Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, provided an opportunity to examine these trends more closely. 
Qualitative methods consisted of four total focus group discussions (two per 
location) and personal interviews with individuals, health care providers, and 
religious leaders. Many themes emerged from these focus groups relating to 
Islam and household decision-making, such as the importance of partner 
dialogue for all household decisions. However, despite this emphasis, men were 
widely believed to have the final say in all decisions and it was thus the women’s 
job to convince her spouse of her opinion if he disagreed, or else follow her 
husband’s lead. Rarely did participants cite a situation where women have 
complete control over decision-making. In both contexts, this belief was rooted in 
interpretations of the Qur’an. However, there were areas in which women were 
perceived as principal decision-makers, including children’s health and 
education.  This was attributed to the time women spend with their children in 
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the home. This role was generally respected, and many participants argued that 
taking care of the children is the noblest role in society.  
 Looking at questions two, three, and four, the quantitative analysis on 
religion and fertility indicated different fertility experiences for Muslim women 
in Cameroon versus Senegal.  Before controls, Muslim women in Cameroon were 
significantly more likely to know and use modern contraceptive methods, to 
have a husband who approves of family planning, to approve of family planning  
themselves, and to have fewer children than their non-Muslim counterparts. 
However, religion may have had less of a role in these patterns than other 
variables, since Muslim women in Cameroon were also significantly more likely 
to be wealthy, live in urban areas and have higher levels of education than non-
Muslims, and the introduction of these variables diminished the significance of 
the original relationship examined. In Senegal, Muslim women (both before and 
after introducing controls) were significantly less likely to know and use modern 
contraceptive methods, to have a husband’s approval of family planning, and to 
approve of family planning themselves. Muslim women in Senegal also had 
more children than non-Muslims, although this relationship reversed once 
controls were added to the model, indicating a lesser influence of religion on this 
outcome.   
The qualitative examination of these questions revealed an ambiguous 
effect of religion on fertility. Results from Cameroon seemed to support the 
characteristics hypothesis that socio-demographic factors other than religion 
account for differences in religious groups’ reproductive behavior (Goldscheider 
1971), since significance dropped in most regression models once controls were 
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introduced. Education, wealth, and urban residency maintained strong 
relationships with the outcome measured.  
In terms of family planning, many participants believed the man had a 
final say in using family planning, although a shift in this may be occurring, 
especially in urban areas and amongst younger generations.  Several young, 
male participants in Senegal expressed support for allowing the woman more of 
a say in her own reproduction.  
 Another thematic area of discussion was the permissibility of Islam in 
regards to contraceptives. The qualitative research indicated that many Muslims 
believe Islam forbids modern contraceptive methods, although all believed Islam 
is in favor of spacing births and several conceded that family planning is still 
practiced by Muslim individuals. In general, women with a higher level of 
education who lived in urban areas were assumed to be most likely to use 
modern contraceptive. In all fertility-related discussion, there was substantially 
more disagreement than in decision-making discussion.  
What do these findings mean? As was expected, religion (specifically 
Islam) informs the lived experiences of women in Cameroon and Senegal, 
especially in regards to involvement in household decision-making. 
Furthermore, religion mediates fertility experiences by defining the morality and 
values of individuals and communities, especially relating to sexuality. Thus, 
efforts to reduce fertility amongst groups characterized by strong religious 
convictions must focus on defining the goals within the religious context. As the 
director of Marie Stopes Senegal – a family planning organization present across 
the world  – articulated in an interview, “you have to work with [the religious] 
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message and you have to work with local religious leaders, because they can 
make it or break it for you.”  
Working within Islam and with religious leaders proved incredibly 
effective in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where over 70% of married women use 
modern contraceptive methods today. One substantial difference between Iran 
and Senegal – where less than 10% of married women use modern contraceptives 
– is that there is widespread belief among Senegalese Muslims that Islam forbids 
contraceptive methods such as the pill. If policymakers want to achieve 
Millennium Development Goal 5b – universal access to reproductive health 
services - effective policy needs to simultaneously take into account these factors 
to encourage an uptake in contraceptive knowledge and access, and thus an 
improvement in overall maternal health (United Nations Development 
Programme 2011). As Mahler (1999) concluded, Islam neither hinders nor 
encourages contraceptive use on a global level. It all depends on the particular 
interpretation of family planning’s permissibility within the religious scripture. 
Policymakers can work alongside religious leaders to disseminate the permissive 
interpretations of Islam in regards to family planning. 
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